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JAPANESE MANUFACTURERS 
WITHOUT FACTORIES*
Sony announced on 18 October, 2000 that she will sell two plant, Sony Nakasinnden(Miyagi-ken, 1300 workers) 
and Sony Industries Taiwan, (Takao, 750 workers) to Solectron so that Sony headquarter could concentrate on 
business planning and product development. This strategy is on the same line of the establishment of a new 
company named EMCS (Engineering Manufacturing and Customer Service Corporation) which was officially 
explained this Spring. This new strategy of a leading Japanese manufacturer indicates separation of manufactu­
ring from product development and a new direction of manufacturing without factory.
About 40days after, on 30 November 2000, Matsus­
hita also announced that she will change the traditional 
business model of divisionalized organization based on 
product group and give more autonomy to each plants. In 
her middle term plan 2001-2004. she intends to integrate 
30 plants among 240 domestic and abroad and separates 
production departments from sales departments.
What does this new movement of Japanese leading 
manufacturers mean to the Japanese production system, 
which was highly appreciated in the world business? 
Does it mean that Japanese manufacturers gave up to 
manufac-ture good-quality product at low price? Why do 
they separate production process from sales or 
marketing? Does this mean that Japanese manufacturers 
will loose the excellent known-how of manufacturing 
which supported competitive advantages of Japanese 
companies in the world market? Are Sony and Matsushita 
exceptional to Japanese manufacturers? What will be 
future trends of Japanese manufacturing? These are the 
questions, which the author intends to address in this 
paper based on four case studies.
A CASE OF SONY
Business conditions of recent Sony
Sony has six main business segments such as 
electronics, game, music, picture, insurance and others.
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The percentage of these business segment in sales and ope­
rating revenue is following; electronics: 64%, game: 9%, 
music: 10%, picture: 7%, insurance: 5%, the other: 5%. On 
the other side the percentage of operating income is follo­
wing; electronics: 42%, game: 27%, music: 10%, picture: 
14%, insurance: 7%, the other: 0%. Therefore, investment 
effectiveness is not so good in electronics, segment.
Operating margin in electronics went down from 
6.8% in 1998 to 2.8% in 1999 and 2.5% in 2000. At the 
same time the amount of sales reached the max around 5 
trillion yen in 1998 and did not go up after that
On the other hand, operating margin of picture 
business went up from 5.7% in 1998 to 7.9% in 1999 and 
7.8% in 2000, although sales amount went down from 
around 600 billion yen to around 500 billion yen in 2000.
Sony had to improve the efficacy of some business 
segment, especially electronics segment.
Foundation of EMCS
In 1980s and 1990s, Sony adopted in-house company 
system so that they could quickly and flexibly adapt to 
turbulent market. In-house companies within company 
include planning, product development, manufacturing 
and sales functions on the base of product groups. Howe­
ver, this business model did not work well in electronics 
industry. The market changes quickly and requests speed­
up of product development.
Under this in-house company system, the company 
can not flexibly move its resources to adapt to new 
business.
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To strengthen the efficiency of production as a whole, 
Sony present the idea of EMCS (Engineering, Manufac­
turing and Customer Services) which engages in engine­
ering, manufacturing and services relating to the pro­
ducts. The EMCS will take the responsibility of 
producing video, acoustics, personal computer, and 
semiconductor from spring 2001. The original parts of 
Sony will engage in business planning and product 
development so that they can develop many products 
quickly. The EMCS can produce any products requested 
by any companies other than Sony. Therefore, the EMCS 
concentrates on production process and services relating 
to their products. On the other side, original parts of Sony 
can concentrate on designing and developing new 
products. This division of labor within Sony group will 
intensify the efficiency of production as a whole.
Merits of EMCS
1. Concentration of in-house company on business plan­
ning and product development
2. Speed-up and flexibility of products development
3. Risk-hedge of facility-investment to specific group of 
products
4. Easy shift of strategy from diversified production to 
solution business like pictures and net business
5. Intensive use of facilities and talents of the plants
Roles of Solectron
On the same strategy of EMCS, Sony sold two plants 
producing car electronics and radio and Walkman which 
are low added-value products. However, Solectron found 
out many merits of buying these plants.
First, these plants have very high level of technology 
in a specific field
Second, these plants can produce many electronics 
products for other companies than Sony.
Third, these plants can be a base for Asian market in 
high added-value products like movable telephone.
Fourth, these plants have many talented engineers and 
skilled workers who can compete in the world market.
CEO of Solectron, Mr. Nisimura told that they learned 
from Japan most of the know-how of good production 
system of Japanese manufacturing in 1980s and 1990s. 
Now they can produce high quality product and deliver 
quickly to any place on the world. This business system 
is fundamentally different from ’’Shitauke” in the tra­
ditional Japanese industry, he added.
Solectron grows rapidly in the last three decades and 
provides a new business model of OEM. She will operate 
as an important partner of Sony in manufacturing.
A CASE OF MATSUSHITA
Recent trends of sales and profit of Matsushita
Matsushita also have three groups of products; 
consumer products like video and audio equipment, home 
appliances and household equipment, industrial products 
like information and communication equipment, robots, 
air-conditioning equipment and car audio, components 
like semiconductors, printed circuit boards and battery. 
The shares of these categories of products among total 
sales in 2000 are; video and audio equipment: 23%, home 
appliance and household equipment: 18%, information 
and communication equipment: 28%, industrial equip­
ment: 10%, components: 21%.
Total amount of sales reached the top of 7,890,662 
million yen in 1998, but went down to 7,299,387 million 
yen in 2000,which is partly caused by the decrease of 
foreign market.
Operating profit also reached 373,901 million yen in 
1997, but went down drastically to 193,684 million yen in 
1999 and 159,054 million yen in 2000 due to intensified 
global price declines, the appreciation of the yen, and 
increases in fixed costs including R&D expenditures. 
These trends of sales and operating profit of Matsushita 
resemble to those of Sony.
Middle-term plan 2001-2004
The middle-term plan announced November 30, 2000 
indicates fundamental changes of business model based 
on the tight integration of production with sales among 
products groups.
First, the new business model gives more autonomy to 
each plant. Each plant will be independent from their 
headquarter of Matsushita and be able to produce their 
products to any company other than Matsushita.
Second, the sales departments of each divisionalized 
business organization will be integrated into both Natio­
nal Marketing Center and Panasonic Marketing Center. 
These marketing centers will concentrate in the sales of 
their own commodities regardless the plants, which 
manufactured these commodities.
Third, Matsushita will integrate and restructure thirty 
plants to increase the efficiency of production in term of 
cost.
This new direction also emphasizes the separation of 
manufacturing from product development and sales. 
However, Matsushita does not intend to sell any plant 
with employees to other companies. She will keep her 
manufacturing parts within the group.
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A CASE OF MISIIMI
A concept of market-in and product-in
Misumi started her business as a trading company of 
press die components. Now she attracts many interests 
both of practitioners and researchers because she grows 
quickly even under difficult market conditions in 1990s 
and with medium-sized employees of 230. She provided 
a new business model even for manufacturers.
Conventional business model would be ” market-out” 
type where manufacturers ask sales agents to sell their 
products. But Misumi introduced a new idea of ’’market- 
out” type where sales agents change into purchasing 
agents who recognize the needs of customers and request 
manufacturers to produce these commodities.
Some characteristics of the business model
To succeed as a purchasing agent, Misumi developed 
new devices as following;
First, she developed big size of catalogue for selling 
industrial parts such as press die components, plastic 
mold components and automated machinery-related 
components to each engineer of many companies.
Second, she organized many manufacturers to supply 
even a small number of parts so that she can satisfy any 
requests from customers.
Third, she established a high reputation of high quality 
of product with lower price than competitors and of 
keeping rigid delivery time even under difficult conditions.
Now she engages mainly in planning business and 
designing industrial products. She does not have any 
factories, but is recognized an excellent manufacturer in 
industrial parts. She uses information technology to 
connect many customers and manufacturers.
Due to her high performance, she plans to extend her 
business to new market like medical, food and visual me­
dia market with the same business model as industrial parts.
A CASE OF PEOPLE
People was founded as a toy manufacturing and sales 
company in 1977 by Chizuko Iwabuchi. She also rapidly 
increased sales in the last decade. She produces a series of 
toys, which stimulate intelligence of children at the age of 
one, two and three. People also does not have any 
factories, although she is classified in toy manufacturer.
Business model
First, People engages only in designing toys and 
deciding volume of production. These activities of 
designing and sales are conducted by a so-called ’’crew”,
a small group of employees responsible for a specific 
series of toy.
Second, the whole production process is outsourced to 
other manufacturers. The crew chooses the best manufac­
turer suitable for each series of toy. The company does 
not have fixed relations with a specific manufacturer.
Third, She tries to minimize the gap between produc­
tion and sales by rigid estimation of demands for each toy 
with the last sales data accumulated. The small company 
of 35 employees can not accept much volume of products 
unsold.
Fourth, She does not use any sales persons for whole­
sales. She assembles wholesalers in summer to explain 
the estimated sales volume at the high time of year-end 
period.
Judging form these characteristics of business model, 
People concentrates on business planning and product 
development by outsourcing manufacturing. People is a 
good example for showing the possibility of manufac­
turer outsourcing production process.
’’FABLESS” STRATEGY OF JAPANESE 
MANUFACTURERS
This new direction of production system in Japanese 
manufacturers is named ’’Fabless” strategy in Japan.
The fabless strategy can be classified into two 
categories. The first type is a company like Matsushita 
who separates production process from business planning 
and product development within the consolidated 
companies. The factories can enjoy more autonomy in the 
relation with other companies and provides good service 
of maintenance of their products.
The second type is a company like Misumi who 
engages only in business planning and product develop­
ment. She organizes many manufacturers for producing a 
specific group of products, which are quite independent 
from Misumi. She outsources the whole process of pro­
duction to independent manufacturers and does not have 
any facilities and know-how of production.
The fabless strategy has some merit in manufacturing 
many products.
First, the headquarters of the company can concent­
rate on business planning and product development and 
speed up this process of manufacturing as a whole. They 
can reach for the economy of speed in manufacturing new 
products.
Second, the company can hedge the risk of big capital 
investment in factory facilities producing a specific pro­
duct. She can quickly change their products without
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thinking the fixed capital for factories. She can easily 
transfer management resources to new products or new 
business.
Third, The factories independent from their headquar­
ters can utilize more effectively the existing facilities and 
talented workforce regardless "Keiretsu” and products 
requested. The factories can concentrate only on produ­
cing many kinds of products.
Fourth, the factories can provide better service of 
maintaining and using the products than the former plants, 
because they have more knowledge about their products 
than the sales departments. The factories themselves can 
directly contact the customers of their products and imp­
rove their products within the same line of development.
The number of these companies following the fabless 
strategy seems small at this moment in Japan. However, 
so long as the leading companies like Sony and Matsus­
hita apply the new strategy, some other companies 
especially in very competitive and turbulent market will 
follow that strategy.
The fabless strategy does not necessarily mean that
the manufacturing companies will loose the important 
know-how of production, because the factories remain in 
the consolidated group of the companies. They can accu­
mulate the knowledge of manufacturing itself by con­
centrating that process only.
Whether this new trend can be followed by manufac­
turers in foreign countries is open question.
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